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Abstract
Between 1993 and 2000 at least 18 countries saw publication of guidelines that propose
minimum representation of outside directors on corporate boards. The apparent premise
underlying this movement is that boards with significant outside directors will make different
and, perhaps, better decisions than boards dominated by inside directors. As the first-mover in
this movement, the U.K. provides a laboratory for a “natural experiment” to examine this
presumption empirically. We investigate one important board task - - the appointment of the
CEO - - to determine whether boards are more likely to appoint an outside CEO after they have
increased the representation of outside directors to comply with the exogenously imposed
standards. We find that the (coerced) increase in outside directors leads to an increase in the
likelihood of an outside CEO appointment. Additionally, announcement period stock returns
indicate that investors appear to view appointments of outside CEOs as good news. Apparently,
boards with more outside directors make different (and perhaps better) decisions.

Correspondence: John J. McConnell, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management,
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Outside Directors and Corporate Board Decisions

1.

Introduction
Historically, the composition of the boards of directors of publicly-traded U.S.

corporations has differed from that of most other countries in that U.S. boards have been
characterized by substantial representation and, in most cases, a majority of outside directors.
For example, in 1990, for 421 of the Fortune 500 firms (i.e., 84.2% of the firms) outsiders
comprised at least 50% of the board membership. In comparison, in 1990, of the largest 25% of
firms, ranked by market capitalization, listed on the stock exchanges of the U.K., France, Italy,
Australia, South Africa, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Brazil and Mexico,
outsiders comprised 50% or more of the board in less than 18% of the firms in each country.
Over the last decade and beyond, pressure has come to bear on publicly-traded
corporations worldwide to increase representation of outside directors.

Between 1993 and

December 2000, at least 18 countries witnessed publication of reports sponsored by their
governments and/or their major stock exchanges that advocated or mandated minimum standards
for outside director representation on boards of publicly-traded companies. These minimum
standards typically represent a major increase in outside board membership in these countries
relative to the early 1990s and before.
Arguably, the recent global movement toward a more prominent role for outside directors
can be traced to the Cadbury Report issued in 1992 in the U.K. Among other things, the
Cadbury Report recommended that publicly-traded U.K. companies have at least three outside
directors. Compliance with the Cadbury recommendation represented a sea-change for U.K.
companies. As documented by Dahya, McConnell and Travlos (DMT) (2001), during 1988,
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outsiders comprised a majority of the board for only 21 of the Financial Times (FT) 500 and, of
all London Stock Exchange (LSE) companies, only 26.7% had at least three outside directors. In
comparison, during 1998, outsiders were a majority of the board for 257 of the FT 500 firms, and
62.3% of all LSE listed companies had at least three outside directors.
The apparent premise underlying the movement towards greater outside director
representation is that more outside directors will lead to different and, presumably, better
decisions by the board. The purpose of this study is to examine one board task to determine
whether this premise is justified. The task upon which we focus is the appointment of the top
manager. Our motivation for focusing on the appointment of CEOs derives from the generally
accepted proposition that one of the key responsibilities of corporate boards is the hiring of top
managers. We ask whether the fraction of outside directors on the board is correlated with the
decision of whether to hire an insider or outsider as the new CEO when the firm’s current CEO is
replaced. We use the U.K. as the laboratory for this study because, as we noted, the U.K. can be
viewed as a first-mover in the global push toward the prescribed inclusion of outside directors.
Additionally, as we will document further below, prior to the mid-1990’s, in terms of its
board compositions, the U.K. was the inverse of the U.S., with outside directors being a distinct
minority in the U.K. and a heavy majority in the U.S. Most importantly, however, because of its
status as the first-mover, the U.K. provides a sufficiently long time series of data following its
recent emphasis on the inclusion of outside board members to allow for a “before-and-after
event” comparison.
The prior study most closely related to ours is Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani (BPT)
(1996) who study board composition and CEO appointments in the U.S. They analyzed 969
CEO appointments over the interval 1970 through 1988. After controlling for other factors, they
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report a positive and significant correlation between the fraction of outside directors and the
probability of a newly-appointed CEO being from outside the company. One of the questions we
address here is whether that result is unique to the U.S. Additionally, however, we go beyond
BPT in that their study potentially suffers from endogeneity in the CEO appointment process: In
particular, it may be that companies that tend to appoint outside CEOs also tend to have a larger
fraction of outside directors. Thus, the correlation reported by BPT may be spurious. Our study
provides a way around this endogeneity.
Specifically, our study of CEO appointments in the U.K. spans the eleven years 1989
through 1999 and, thus, encompasses the period from before to after the publication of the
Cadbury Report in 1992. Publication of the Report represents a “natural” experiment in which
an exogenous force coerced companies into adding outside directors.

If the appointments

process is endogenous, then, presumably, addition of outside directors in response to this
exogenous mandate will have no effect on the CEO appointment process. We do not find that to
be the case.
Both before and after U.K. firms comply with the Cadbury Report, the probability of an
outside CEO appointment increases with the fraction of outside board members. Additionally,
however, once a firm comes into compliance with the Cadbury recommendation, the probability
of an outside CEO appointment increases further. Thus, at least in part, the appointment decision
is not endogenous: Outside directors tend to appoint outside CEOs.
As we describe later, different countries have taken different prescriptive routes toward
increasing the role of outside directors. The U.K. and Thailand have specified a minimum
number of outsiders. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Greece, India, Mexico, and Singapore have
specified a minimum fraction.

France, Malaysia, and South Africa have specified both a
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minimum number and a minimum fraction. Korea has initially specified a minimum number of
outside directors with a further provision that provides for a minimum fraction of outside
directors over a longer term. We also address the question of whether it is the number or fraction
of outside directors that affects the CEO appointment decision. We determine that the fraction of
outside directors dominates the number, and that, after controlling for other factors in a
multivariate analysis, the relationship between the fraction of outside directors and the
company’s propensity to appoint an outside CEO increases as the fraction of outside directors
increases.
Of course, these results only indicate that more outsiders on the board lead to different
decisions (or, at least, different CEO appointment decisions).
whether the CEO appointment decisions are better.

The results do not indicate

To address that question, at least

preliminarily, we conduct an event study in which we examine excess stock returns around
announcements of CEO appointments. For the companies in our sample, announcements of
outside CEO appointments are accompanied by an average 2-day excess stock return (0.79%)
that is significantly greater than the average 2-day excess stock return that accompanies inside
CEO appointments (0.20%). Thus, given that the probability of an outside CEO appointment
increases as the fraction of outside directors increases, the global push toward a more prominent
role for outside directors is apparently good news for shareholders. Not only are the board’s
decisions different, on average, investors apparently expect them to be better.

2.

The global movement toward outside directors
As we noted, in 1992, the Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance

issued by the Cadbury Committee recommended, among other things, that boards of publicly-
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traded U.K. companies include at least three outside directors. Although these recommendations
have not been legislated, the committee was appointed by the government and the
recommendations have been adopted by the LSE. Between publication of the Cadbury Report
and December 2000, at least 18 other countries witnessed publication of similar reports. The
introductory statement in the Handbook for Issuers on The Copenhagen Stock Exchange (2001)
offers up a justification for this global movement:
Initially, the Corporate Governance debate arose partly in response to pressure
from the increasingly prevalent institutional ownership, and partly in response to
financial scandals at the end of the 1980’s… The Cadbury Report contained a
number of specific recommendations regarding good corporate governance also
called ‘best practice’ or ‘code of conduct’. The aim was to meet the demands of
the institutional owners and to prevent new business and financial scandals…
The debate has more recently moved from primarily being driven by a wish to
stimulate ‘owner activism’ and increase the supervision of management… (p. 1)
In that spirit, in 1993, the Swedish Shareholders Association established guidelines for
boards of publicly-traded Swedish corporations that closely mimicked those of the Cadbury
committee. In 1994, the King Committee Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa
recommended that publicly-traded companies have at least 2 outside directors and equal numbers
of inside and outside directors and, in 1995, the Bosch Committee Report on Corporate Practices
and Conduct in Australia prescribed that, for listed firms, a majority of the board be outsiders
and at least one-third be independent.
In 1998, the Report on Desirable Corporate Governance issued by the Confederation of
Indian Industry promulgated that for large firms at least 30% of the board comprise outside
directors unless the chairman of the board is also CEO, in which case the fraction of outsiders
should be at least 50%; the Report on the Roles, Duties and Responsibilities of the Directors of
Listed Companies issued by the Stock Exchange of Thailand mandated that boards of exchangelisted firms have at least 2 outside directors; and the Report on Corporate Governance for
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Belgian Listed Companies adopted by the Brussels Stock Exchanges specified that the board
consist of a majority of outsiders.
In 1999, at least six countries witnessed the issuance of mandates and/or guidelines for
board composition: In Korea, the Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance, backed by
the Korean Stock Exchange, recommended that financial institutions and large public
corporations have at least 3 outside directors and gradually increase the ratio of outsiders to
greater than 50%; in Malaysia, a Report on Corporate Governance issued by the High Level
Finance Committee and, in France, the Vienot Report on the Boards of Directors of Listed
Companies in France - - proposed that one-third of the board comprise independent outside
directors with no fewer than 2 outsiders; in Mexico, the Code of Corporate Governance prepared
for listed companies recommended that at least 20% of the board be outsiders; and, finally, in
Greece, the Principles of Corporate Governance issued by the Capital Market Commission and,
in Brazil, the Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance issued by the IBGC,
recommended that outsiders comprise at least 50% of the board.

3.

Prior studies
As we noted, the prior study most directly related to ours is Borokhovich, Parrino and

Trapani (BPT) (1996). They analyzed 969 CEO appointments at 588 large publicly-traded U.S.
companies over the period 1970 through 1988. Of these 969 appointments, 187 were outsiders.
After controlling for corporate performance, firm size, and CEO share ownership, they report a
significant positive correlation between the fraction of outside directors and the likelihood that a
new CEO will be appointed from outside the firm. The apparent conclusion is that adding
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outside directors increases the probability that the board will appoint a new CEO from outside
the company.
However, as argued by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), board composition (i.e., the split
between inside and outside directors) and CEO appointments may be endogenous. If so, it could
be that firms that are more likely to appoint outside CEOs are also more likely to appoint outside
directors.

If that is the case, the correlation observed by BPT may be spurious.

If this

correlation is spurious, i.e., the CEO selection decision is endogenous, changes in board
composition should have no impact on CEO selection. Suppose, for example, that firm A
optimally has few outside directors (say 20% outsiders) and optimally chooses its CEO from an
internal labor pool, while firm B optimally has many outside directors (say 80% outsiders) and
optimally chooses an outside CEO. If the CEO selection process is endogenous, and if an
external force coerces these firms to reverse their board compositions, and if the boards continue
to act optimally in selecting their CEOs, firm A will continue to select its CEO internally and
firm B will continue to select its CEO from an external labor pool.
Because the Cadbury Report spurred dramatic changes in the composition of U.K.
boards, our analysis of U.K. data provides an opportunity to alleviate the problems that may arise
from the possible endogeneity of board composition and CEO selection. If the correlation
observed by BPT is spurious, we should find no shift in the likelihood that outside CEOs are
appointed in the U.K. following the Cadbury Report. That is, the CEO selection process should
be unaffected in firms that are coerced into adding outside directors. The fraction of outside
directors might increase, but board decisions will be unchanged.
Of course, BPT is not the only study to analyze the relation between board structure and
CEO appointments. As part of their study of corporate performance and CEO turnover in Japan,
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Kang and Shivdasani (1995) examine factors that influence the decision by Japanese companies
to appoint an outside CEO. They examine 174 CEO turnover events over the period 1985
through 1990. Of these, 18 represent outside appointments. The authors report that an outside
CEO appointment is significantly more likely when the company’s prior performance has been
poor and when stock ownership is concentrated among several large shareholders. They also
report a positive correlation between the presence of one or more outside directors on the board
and the probability of an outside CEO appointment. But, with p-values ranging from 0.12 to
0.19 in various regression specifications, the coefficient of this variable is not significant at
traditionally acceptable levels. Of course, the sample is quite small.

4.

Sample and data sources
We construct an initial sample of 914 companies by selecting every second entry from a

comprehensive set of companies listed on the LSE as of December 1988. For each company,
stock price and accounting data are taken from Datastream for the years 1985 through 1988. If
such data are not available, the company is dropped from the sample. Ninety-nine companies
were dropped because of insufficient stock price data; 115 were dropped due to insufficient
accounting data. The resulting sample contains 700 companies. For each of these firms, for
each year 1988 through 1999, we used the Corporate Register and/or annual filings maintained
at Companies House to identify the top manager.

We identified the top manager as the

individual holding the title of chief executive officer (CEO) or, if no individual held the title of
CEO, we identified the executive chairman as the top manager. Henceforth, we refer to the top
manager as the CEO.
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For each year 1988 through 1999, we also used the Corporate Register and/or annual
filings to determine the age of the CEO, the size of the board, the number of outside directors,
the total number of shares held by board members, and the total number of shares held by
institutions. A director is considered an outsider if he/she is listed as a “non-executive” director,
he/she is not related to the company’s controlling family, and he/she was not employed by the
company historically.

Among other things, this procedure identified all changes (i.e., all

turnover and, therefore, all appointments) in the top management position for each company.
We are interested in whether newly-appointed CEOs come from within or outside the
company.

To make that determination, for each instance in which we identified a

turnover/appointment in the CEO position, we reviewed the company’s prior-year board roster in
the Corporate Register and/or the company’s annual filings. If the new CEO was already a
member of the board, we consider this to be an inside appointment. If not, we reviewed articles
in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times, and Macarthy’s News Information
Service to confirm that the new CEO was from outside the company. In this way, we were able
to identify (and confirm) every new CEO as either an inside or an outside appointment. For
certain tests, we repeated this procedure to determine whether the departing CEO had been an
insider or an outsider at the time of his appointment.
We are also interested in the circumstances under which the new CEO was hired. In
particular, we are interested in whether the previous CEO departed his/her position involuntarily.
We classify turnover in the CEO position as “forced” by examining articles in the Extel Weekly
News Summaries, the Financial Times, and Macarthy’s News Information Service. Turnover is
labeled forced when: (1) a news article states that the executive was “fired”; (2) an article states
that the executive “resigned”; or (3) an article indicates that the company was experiencing poor
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performance. In addition, for (2) and (3), the executive must be less than 60 years old and no
other article can indicate that the executive took a position elsewhere or cite health or death as
the reason for the executive’s departure.
In later analyses, we are interested in firm size and performance. For these analyses, we
take accounting and stock price data from Datastream. Our measure of firm size is the book
value of assets. We use both accounting earnings and stock returns to measure performance. To
measure stock price performance, we use industry- and size-adjusted stock returns (ISARs),
where ISARs are calculated by subtracting the daily stock returns of an industry- and sizematched portfolio from the return of the sample company beginning 153 trading days prior to,
and ending 3 days prior to, the announcement of the CEO appointment. To construct the
industry- and size-matched portfolio, for each company in our sample, all other companies with
the same Financial Times Industry Classification (FTIC) code are ranked from largest to
smallest according to their equity market values. The companies are divided into four size
portfolios. The differences between the return on the stock in our sample and the equal-weighted
average return of the appropriate industry- and size-matched portfolio are calculated. The sum
of these differences is the ISAR for that company.
As our measure of accounting performance, we use 3-year average industry-adjusted
return on assets (IAROA). For each year, for each company in the sample, we calculate ROA as
earnings before depreciation, interest and taxes (EBDIT) divided by beginning of the year total
assets. Then, for each firm with the same FTIC as the sample firm, we calculate ROA in the
same way. Next, for each year, for each FTIC group, we determine the median ROA. IAROA is
calculated by subtracting the industry median ROA from the sample company’s ROA for each of
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the three years prior to a CEO appointment. The average of these three IAROAs is our measure
of accounting performance.

5.

Analysis

5.1.

CEO appointments and board composition: A first look
As a first-pass analysis, we examine the relationship between CEO appointments and

board composition by stratifying the companies in our sample into deciles according to the
fraction of their boards comprising outside directors.

This stratification of the sample is

displayed in Table 1.
The table gives the total number of CEO appointments, the number of outside CEO
appointments, and the number of outside CEO appointments as a fraction of the total number of
CEO appointments according to the fraction of the board composed of outside directors. The
primary statistic of interest to us is the percentage of outside CEO appointments relative to total
appointments. The table clearly demonstrates a positive correlation between the percentage of
outside CEO appointments and the fraction of outside directors. The percentage of outside CEO
appointments increases with the fraction of outside directors, at least up to 70% outside directors.
In the range of 0.60 to 0.70 outside directors, the percentage of outside CEO appointments
reaches a maximum of 49.3%. After 70% outside directors, the percentage of outside CEO
appointments drops off slightly.
Additionally, although 40% of the total number of CEO appointments in our sample
occur in companies for which outside directors comprise less than 0.40 of the board, only 8.0%
of outside CEO appointments occur in these firms. Thus, in U.K. companies in which inside
directors dominate the board, appointment of an outside CEO is rare.
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For comparison, in Table 1, we present similar data for U.S. CEO appointments taken
from BPT (1996). (Recall their sample encompasses 588 large public companies for the years
1970 through 1988.) For BPT, however, the number of observations for firms with boards
comprising 0 to 0.40 outside directors is so few that they compress these deciles into a single
category. Contrary to the U.K., for the U.S., the bulk of all CEO appointments occur in the
deciles of companies in which outside directors comprise more than 0.70 of the board
membership. That is, most of the companies in the U.S. sample have boards dominated by
outside directors.
Like the U.K., in the U.S., appointment of outside CEOs is rare in companies with boards
composed of fewer than 0.40 outside directors. Of course, in the U.S., few CEO appointments of
any kind occur for boards with fewer than 0.40 outside directors because such companies are
relatively rare. A further commonality between the two sets of data is the positive relationship
between the propensity for firms to appoint outside CEOs and the fraction of outside directors - as the fraction of outside directors increases from decile to decile, the fraction of outside CEO
appointments increases as well, except at the very upper end of the range for U.K. companies.
As we document later, in a multivariate context, this apparent drop off in the propensity to
appoint outside CEOs disappears.
Thus, on the basis of the data so far, the evidence on CEO appointments and board
composition indicates that results from the U.S. can be generalized to at least one other country.
As we emphasized above, however, this relationship could be spurious due to an endogenous
relationship between CEO appointments and the fraction of outside directors.
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5.2.

U.K. board composition and CEO appointments through time
As a possible way to circumvent the potential endogeneity between board composition

and CEO appointments, we focus on an interval surrounding the publication of the Cadbury
Report in December 1992. Publication of the Cadbury Report presents a natural experiment in
which an external force pressured U.K. companies into increasing the number of outside
directors. DMT (2001) report that board sizes increased, on average, by about 1.5 members
(from 5.7 to 7.3) and that the fraction of outside directors increased by about 10% (from 35.3%
to 46.0%) over the four years following the Cadbury Report (1993-1996) in comparison with the
prior four years (1989-1992). They further report a significant increase in the rate of CEO
turnover from before to after publication of the Report, and this increase in CEO turnover is
concentrated among firms that came into compliance with the recommendations of the Cadbury
Committee.
Table 2 reports data on board composition and CEO turnover/appointments by year for
our sample for the period 1989 through 1999. As shown in the table, the total number of CEO
appointments over this period is 523. On an annual basis, the number of appointments is
relatively stable through time. However, because the number of firms in the sample declines
through time due to mergers, bankruptcies and other delistings, the rate of turnover/appointments
increases through time, especially after 1992. Over the four years, 1989 through 1992, the
average annual rate of CEO turnover/appointments is 7.3%. Over the next seven years, the
average annual rate is 10.1%. Thus, consistent with DMT, the rate of CEO turnover and,
therefore, the rate of CEO appointments increased significantly after 1992 (p-value for the
difference = 0.08.) Similarly, the average board size increased by about 1.5 members after 1992
(from 6.0 to 7.5) and the fraction of outside directors increased from about 43% to 55%.
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In terms of inside vs. outside CEO appointments, the table demonstrates several
phenomena.

First, in those companies that appoint outside CEOs, the fraction of outside

directors is significantly higher than in those companies that appoint inside CEOs (i.e., 57% vs.
46%). Second, both for companies that appoint outside CEOs and those that appoint inside
CEOs, the fraction of outside directors increases significantly, and by about the same proportion,
from before to after 1992.

This result is consistent with CEO appointments and board

composition being endogenous. That is, regardless of whether the companies were appointing
outside or inside CEOs, the fraction of outside directors has increased through time.

For

example, by 1999, for those companies that appointed inside CEOs in that year, the fraction of
outside directors (0.50) was about the same as for those firms that appointed outside CEOs prior
to 1992 (0.51). Thus, adding outside directors may not alter the CEO appointment decision. It
may merely change the board composition.
Third, however, according to the last column of the table, the number of outside CEO
appointments as a fraction of all CEO appointments did increase from before to after 1992. Of
the total of 189 CEO appointments over the four years 1989 through 1992, 26% were outsiders.
In comparison, of the 334 CEO appointments over the period 1993 through 1999, 32% were
outsiders. The p-value for the difference in percentages of outside CEO appointments from
before to after 1992 is 0.03. This result is consistent with an exogenously imposed increase in
outside directors increasing the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment.
According to BPT (1996), in the U.S., an outside CEO is significantly more likely to be
appointed when the prior CEO was “forced” from office than when he/she departed
“voluntarily.” To examine whether this effect is present in our data, we replicate the analysis of
Table 2 separately for the set of companies in which the CEO appointments followed “forced”
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turnover and for all others. We do not present these results in a table. Similar to DMT, the rate
of CEO turnover increased from before to after 1992, and the increase was concentrated in the
set of companies with forced turnover. That is, the rate of CEO turnover increased following the
Cadbury Report and the increase is due to an increase in “forced” CEO turnover. Additionally,
in those cases where CEO turnover is forced, the fraction of outside CEO appointments is
significantly higher than when CEO turnover is voluntary (54% vs. 17%, p-value < 0.01). In our
subsequent multivariate analysis, we control for “forced” turnover.
5.3.

Adoption of the Cadbury recommendations, board composition, and CEO
appointments
Our analysis of the time series of CEO appointments in Table 2 indicates that the rate of

outside appointments increased following publication of the Cadbury Report. If the Report did
have an impact on CEO appointments, the effect should be most pronounced among those
companies that adopted the Cadbury Committee’s outside director provision.

That is, the

company increased the number of its outside directors to at least three. In panel A of Table 3, we
present data on the composition of the boards and CEO appointments for these 296 companies.
That is, of the 700 companies in the initial sample, 296 of them increased the number of outside
directors to at least three during the period covered by our study.
As shown in the table, for these companies, the average board size increased from about
4.7 members as of 1989 to about 7.9 as of 1999 and the fraction of outside directors increased
from approximately 0.35 to approximately 0.63.

Also, the annual rate of CEO

turnover/appointments increased from 7.0% over the four years prior to the Cadbury Report to
12.9% over the following seven years. The p-value for this increase is 0.02. Thus, for the set of
companies that adopted the Cadbury recommendation, the rate of CEO turnover/appointments
increased significantly from before to after 1992.
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To determine whether increasing the presence of outside directors increased the
propensity of boards to appoint outside CEOs, we divide the number of outside CEO
appointments by the total number of appointments before and after 1992 for these 169
companies. For the four years prior to 1992, the percentage of outside CEO appointments was
24.4%. For the seven years after 1992, the percentage of outside appointments was 35.4%. The
p-value for the increase was 0.02.
For comparison, panel B of Table 3 shows the same data for the set of companies that
were already in compliance with the Cadbury recommendation as of December 1988. For these
companies, the board size increased from about 6.2 to about 7.9 from before to after 1992, but
the fraction of outside directors remained nearly constant at 0.60 throughout the time period. In
terms of CEO turnover, this rate is also constant from before to after 1992. For the years 1989
through 1992, the annual rate of CEO turnover/appointments was 9.3%; for the years 1993
through 1999, it was also 9.3%. Similarly, outside CEO appointments as a percentage of total
CEO appointments was nearly constant from before to after 1992 for this set of companies. For
the years, 1989 through 1992, the rate of outside CEO appointments was 30.0%; for the next
seven years the rate was 28.6%. The p-value for this difference is 0.81. The data in panels A
and B support the hypothesis that outside directors tend to appoint outside CEOs and that
increasing the representation of outside directors on the board increases the likelihood of an
outside CEO appointment.
Because the companies in our sample did not all comply with the Cadbury
recommendation in the same year, we examine CEO appointments according to the year in
which the company increased the number of outside directors to at least three following
December 1992, we refer to this as the year of Cadbury adoption.

We examine board
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composition and CEO appointments for the four years prior to the year of adoption and for the
four years following adoption. These data are displayed in panel C of Table 3. In this panel, y is
the year of adoption. The data in this panel starkly demonstrate the effect of Cadbury adoption
on board composition. Over the four years before adoption, on average, outside directors
comprised about 45.8% of the board; over the four years after adoption and post-1992, on
average, outside directors comprised approximately 61.9% of the board.
Of particular interest to us is the increase in the fraction of outside CEO appointments
that accompanies the increase in outside directors. As shown in the last column of panel C, over
the four years prior to Cadbury adoption, outside CEO appointments were 20.0% of all CEO
appointments. Over the four years following Cadbury adoption, the fraction of outside CEO
appointments more than doubled to 40.1% of all CEO appointments (p-value for the difference
< 0.01.) This result strongly points to the interpretation that outside board members are more
likely to appoint outside CEOs, and that an increase in outside directors is likely to affect the
CEO appointment decision.
5.4.

Multivariate analysis
Other factors, in addition to board composition, are likely to affect the decision of

whether to appoint an inside or outside CEO. For example, the company’s prior performance,
the company’s size, and the concentration of share ownership might influence the board’s
decision. To control for these other factors, we conduct binomial probit regressions on our
sample of 523 CEO appointments.
In each of our regressions, the dependent variable is an indicator to identify whether the
CEO appointment was an outsider (1) or an insider (0). In the first regression, the independent
variables are the company’s prior performance measured with ISARs as described above, firm
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size measured as log of book assets, the number of directors as of the beginning of the year, the
fraction of directors who are outsiders as of the beginning of the year, the fraction of shares
owned by the board as of the beginning of the year, the fraction of shares owned by institutions
as of the beginning of the year, an indicator variable to identify whether the appointment follows
“forced” turnover (1) or not (0), an indicator variable to identify whether the firm is a financial
institution (1) or not (0), and an indicator variable to identify whether the incumbent CEO was
from outside (1) or inside (0) the company.
We include the company’s prior performance because companies that are performing
poorly may be more likely to appoint an outside CEO; we include size because large companies
may have a larger internal labor pool and may, therefore, be more likely to appoint an inside
CEO; we include board size and share ownership because these factors may directly or indirectly
influence the CEO appointment decision; we include an indicator for forced turnover because
our descriptive data indicate that an outside CEO is more likely to be appointed when his/her
predecessor was forced from office; we include an indicator for financial institutions because a
cursory examination of the data indicates that financial institutions, as a general rule, have a
larger fraction of outside directors than firms in other industries, and we include an indicator for
whether the predecessor to the newly-appointed CEO was himself an insider or outsider at the
time of his appointment. We include the fraction of outside directors to determine whether the
apparent positive correlation between the fraction of outside directors and the likelihood of
appointing an outside CEO persists after controlling for other factors. Finally, we include the
square of the fraction of outside directors because the descriptive data in Table 1 present the
possibility that the relationship between the probability of an outside CEO appointment and the
fraction of outside directors may decline above a certain level of outside directors.
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The results of this regression are presented in the first column of Table 4. According to
this regression, poorly performing companies are more likely to appoint an outside CEO (p-value
= 0.08); companies in which the prior CEO was “forced” from office are more likely to appoint
an outside CEO (p-value < 0.01); and smaller companies are more likely to appoint outside
CEOs (p-value = 0.02).

The coefficient of the incumbent’s origin is negative, albeit not

significant at the 0.10 level - - its p-value is 0.17. This hints that, after controlling for other
factors, if the existing CEO is from inside the firm, the next CEO is slightly more likely to come
from outside the firm and vice versa. None of the other control variables even begin to approach
significance at any meaningful level (all p-values > 0.28). In each of our subsequent regressions,
the p-values of these control variables, along with that of the incumbent’s origin, are essentially
the same as those in the first regression. As a result, we will not comment further on these
variables.
The variables of particular interest, for our purposes, are the fraction of outside directors
and the fraction of outside directors squared. The coefficient of the fraction of outside directors
is positive and significant (p-value = 0.05). The coefficient of the square of the fraction of
outside directors is mildly negative, but does not approach statistical significance (p-value =
0.59).
To explore further the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between the likelihood of an
outside CEO appointment and the fraction of outside directors, we estimate a piecewise linear
regression with four segments: 0.0 to 0.299, 0.300 to 0.499, 0.500 to 0.799, and 0.800 to 1.000
for the fraction of outside directors. The results of this regression are given in the second column
of Table 4. According to this regression, after controlling for other factors in a multivariate
context, the relationship between the fraction of outside directors and the probability of an

20
outside CEO appointment is positive and statistically significant over each of the four line
segments - - the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment increases over the entire range as the
fraction of outside directors increases. Because the explanatory power of the regression with the
piecewise specification for the fraction of outside directors is marginally higher than for the
regression with the fraction of outside directors squared, we use this specification in subsequent
analyses.
The estimated positive correlation between the fraction of outside directors and outside
CEO appointments is consistent with BPT (1996) and with the proposition that outside directors
are more likely to appoint outside CEOs. However, as we discussed above, this result is also
consistent with a spurious correlation between CEO appointments and the fraction of outside
directors that derives from an endogenous relationship between the CEO appointment decision
and board composition.
Our third regression aims to control for the possible endogeneity between the fraction of
outside directors and the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment. This regression includes all
of the control variables from the second regression. Additionally, we include an indicator
variable to identify firms that came into compliance with the Cadbury recommendation
following December 1992. That is, we include an indicator variable for the set of companies that
increased the number of outside directors to at least three over the interval January 1993 through
1999. For these companies, if a CEO appointment occurs after compliance with this provision of
the Cadbury Report, the indicator variable is set equal to 1. For all other appointments, this
variable is set to 0.
For each appointment, we also include the fraction of outside directors. However, for
companies that adopt the Cadbury recommendation (i.e., change their boards to come into
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compliance) following 1992, we keep the fraction of outside directors at its pre-adoption level.
The question we are asking, then, is - - does coming into compliance with the Cadbury Report
affect the CEO appointment decision after controlling for what the composition of the board
would have been at its pre-adoption level? For all other appointments, we use the fraction of the
board composed of outside directors. Furthermore, for CEO appointments by companies that
came into compliance during the period studied, but for which an appointment preceded
compliance, we use the fraction of outside directors on the board as of the CEO appointment
date.
The results of this regression are given in the third column of Table 4. The coefficients
for the fractions of outside directors continue to be positive and to have the same levels of
significance as in the prior regression. Additionally, the coefficient of the Cadbury adoption
indicator variable is positive and highly significant (p-value = 0.01). This result indicates that
companies that alter their boards to become compliant with the Cadbury Report are significantly
more likely to appoint an outside CEO than they would have been in the absence of this
alteration to their boards. Importantly, this result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the
CEO appointment process and board composition are (completely) endogenous. That is, these
data indicate that this exogenously induced modification to board composition has altered CEO
appointment decisions in the U.K.
One further question that we investigate is whether the movement to three outside
directors is consequential in itself or whether it is the implied increase in the fraction of outside
directors that fundamentally affects the CEO appointment decision. To explore that question we
estimate the final regression in Table 4. This regression is the same as the third regression
except that, for each appointment, we use the fraction of outside directors at the time of CEO

22
appointment regardless of whether the company adopted the Cadbury recommendation. And, we
include the indicator variable to identify firms that adopted the recommendation post-1992.
As shown in the table, the significance levels for the fraction of outside directors are
similar to those in the second regression, but the significance level of the Cadbury adoption
indicator variable drops to 0.58. This regression indicates that it is not the appointment of three
outside directors that is critical, rather it is the increase in the fraction of outside directors that is
consequential to the appointment decision. Or, to put it differently, the appointment of three
outside directors is likely to have much less effect in a board with 15 members than in a board
with five members.
5.5.

Accounting performance
We also estimated each of the regressions in Table 4 with our measure of accounting

performance, IAROA, (as described in Section 3) in place of stock price performance, ISAR.
The levels of significance of the coefficients in these regressions are nearly identical to those in
Table 4.
5.6.

A different type of endogeneity
Our analysis has considered the possibility that the correlation between the fraction of

outside directors and the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment is spurious due to an
endogeneity in CEO appointment decisions and board composition. But, our results could be
influenced by a different type of endogeneity. For example, suppose that a firm is performing
poorly. Suppose, then, that a decision is made both to add outside directors and to appoint an
outside CEO. In that case, the observed correlation between the addition of outside directors and
the appointment of an outside CEO is spurious. It is not due to any cause and effect relation
between the presence of outside directors and CEO appointments. Rather, it is due to concurrent
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decisions to add outside directors and to appoint an outside CEO neither of which were in
response to Cadbury and both of which would have happened in the absence of Cadbury.
This type of spurious correlation is unlikely to explain our results. First, in conducting
our analysis, we do not consider a CEO appointment to be post-Cadbury adoption unless the
appointment occurred during the year following the calendar year in which the firm increased the
number of outside directors to three or more. Thus, the two events are not concurrent by
construction.
Still, however, it may be that the outside CEO appointments tend to occur with a short lag
following a change in board composition. If so, outside CEO appointments would be clustered
immediately after Cadbury adoption. To evaluate this possibility, we examine the time series of
outside CEO appointments relative to the year in which a company adopted Cadbury. For the 57
outside CEO appointments that occurred in the 4 years immediately after the companies adopted
Cadbury, 14 occurred during the first calendar year following the year of adoption, 13 occurred
during the second calendar year after adoption, 15 occurred during the third year, and 15
occurred during the fourth year. Over these 4 years, the number of firms in the sample declines
slightly, but the number of outside CEO appointments remains steady. Thus, post-adoption
outside CEO appointments were not clustered shortly after the companies adopted Cadbury.
Again, these data are not consistent with the concurrent appointment of outside directors and an
outside CEO, both of which would have occurred in the absence of Cadbury.

6.

Stock prices and appointments of CEOs
Our analyses of board composition and CEO appointments indicate that the mandating of

additional outside directors to corporate boards is likely to lead to different board decisions, or at
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least different CEO appointment decisions. Whether these decisions will be better is another
question. In this section, we present evidence on that question by performing an event study in
which we examine stock returns around announcements of appointments of CEOs.
To conduct our event study, we use the market model procedure with market model
parameters estimated using daily stock returns over the interval of 153 trading days prior to the
announcement day through 3 days prior to the announcement day. We examine excess stock
returns over the 2-day interval that encompasses the day on which the company issued its press
release announcing a CEO appointment and the following day.
We conduct our event study of CEO appointments with the 523 appointments in our
sample. Announcement dates are taken from Extel Weekly News Summaries. As shown in panel
A of table 5, for the 156 outside CEO appointments, the two-day announcement period average
excess stock return is 0.794% with a p-value of 0.01. For the 367 inside CEO appointments, the
average excess stock return is 0.203% with a p-value of 0.20. The p-value for the difference
between the two average excess returns is less than 0.01. Thus, the stock price reaction to both
inside and outside CEO appointments is positive, but the reaction to outside appointments is
significantly greater than the reaction to inside CEO appointments, and the reaction to inside
appointments is not significantly different from zero. Thus, to the extent that increasing the
presence of outside directors increases the likelihood of outside CEO appointments, coerced
changes in board composition that increase the fraction of outside directors appear to be good
news for shareholders - - not only do such modifications give rise to different board decisions,
the stock price data indicate that market participants view the decisions as better.
As a refinement of this test, we split the outside appointments into those that occurred
pre-1992 and/or pre-Cadbury adoption (the pre-adoption set) and those that occurred post-1992
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and post-Cadbury adoption (the post-adoption set) and conduct an event study for the two groups
separately. We conduct this analysis because our set of outside CEO appointments contains
some that occurred prior to the Cadbury Report and some that occurred post-1992, but were not
among companies that had recently complied with the Cadbury Report. Presumably, the CEO
appointment decisions by these companies were not altered by the Cadbury recommendation.
They would have occurred anyway. It is possible that the significant excess return associated
with outside appointments is due to those that would have occurred regardless of the Cadbury
Report. As shown in Table 5, the average two-day announcement period excess return for the
pre-adoption set is 0.78%; for the post-adoption set, it is 0.80%. Thus, the positive excess return
associated with outside CEO appointment is not confined to those that would have occurred
regardless of Cadbury - - outside CEO appointments appear to be good news for shareholders.
We examine one other factor.

We split the sample according to the origin of the

departing CEO and the origin of the new CEO. That is, we split the sample into four sets - those in which the departing CEO and the new CEO were from inside the company (319
observations); those in which the departing CEO and the new CEO were from outside the
company (29 observations); those in which the departing CEO was from outside while his
replacement was from inside (48 observations) and the remainder set (127 observations). The
stock price reactions are positive and significant for outside CEO appointments and insignificant
for inside appointments regardless of the incumbent’s origins.
One well-recognized shortcoming of simple event studies such as this one is that they do
not control for investors’ expectations. For example, it could be that inside appointments are
well anticipated, whereas, outside appointments involve greater uncertainty. In that case, it
could be that inside and outside appointments are viewed equally positively by market
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participants, but because inside appointments have been well anticipated, the observed stock
price reaction to such appointments is muted. If we could control for market expectations, we
would expect to see the greatest stock price reaction, either positive or negative, to appointments
that run counter to expectations. That is, suppose market participants had been expecting an
inside CEO appointment, but the company announces an outside appointment. Then, assuming
that an outside appointment is good news, we would expect a larger and positive stock price
reaction relative to the case in which investors had been expecting an outside appointment and an
outside appointment was announced even though the outside appointment is still good news.
Now consider the opposite case. Suppose market participants had been expecting an
outside appointment, but the firm announces an inside appointment. Again, assuming that an
outside appointment is good news, the stock price response should be lower relative to the case
in which investors had been expecting an inside appointment and an inside appointment was
announced.
To calibrate market expectations, we use the final regression from Table 4 to estimate the
likelihood of an outside CEO appointment for each appointment in our sample. For the sample
of outside CEO appointments, we group the 2-day announcement period excess return into three
mutually exclusive groups according to the probability of an outside CEO appointment implied
from Table 4: (1) low probability - - 0.00 to 0.33, (2) medium probability - - 0.34 and 0.66; and
(3) high probability - - 0.67 to 1.00. The event study results for the corresponding groups of
CEO appointments are presented in the last column in panel B of Table 5. Outside CEO
appointments are associated with statistically significant positive announcement period returns
and, importantly, as the probability of an outside appointment declines, the announcement period
excess return becomes larger. That is, the more unexpected the outside appointment is, the more
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positive is the stock price response.

For example, when the probability of an outside

appointment is 0.67 to 1.00, the announcement period excess return is 0.43% (p-value = 0.05);
when the probability of an outside appointment is 0.00 to 0.33, the announcement period excess
return is 1.135% (p-value < 0.01). As regards inside CEO appointments, in no category is the
announcement period return significantly different from zero.
To further explore the relation between market expectations and announcement period
returns, we regress the 2-day announcement period excess returns against the implied probability
of an outside CEO appointment from Table 4. The results of the cross-sectional regressions are
presented in the last column in panel C of Table 5. If outside CEO appointments are good news,
or at least better news than an inside appointment, the coefficient of this cross sectional OLS
regression should be negative - - as it is, with a p-value of 0.10. Then, for the sample of inside
appointments, we perform the same regression the results of which are given in the middle
column of panel C of Table 5.

Again, if outside appointments are good news or, more

accurately, if they are less better news than inside appointments, the coefficient for inside CEO
appointments will be negative - - which it is again, but, in this case, the p-value is only 0.29. The
regression results support our interpretation of the event study to mean that investors view
outside CEO appointments as good news.

7.

Commentary and conclusions
Over the last decade (and beyond), stock exchanges and governmental bodies have

pushed publicly-traded companies to increase the number and fraction of outside directors on
their boards. Specifically, over the period 1993 through 2000, at least 18 countries have seen
publication of official reports that recommend or mandate either a minimum fraction or a
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minimum number of outside directors for public companies and this minimum is substantially
higher than the historical norm in those countries. This movement toward an increased role for
outside directors appears to rest on the twin presumptions that boards with more outside directors
will make different decisions, and that those decisions will be better, than otherwise would have
been the case. Both of these premises are largely untested.
In this study, we investigate whether an increase in outside directors is likely to influence
one, arguably primary, board decision - - the appointment of the company’s CEO.

Our

investigation of data from the U.K. over a time period that spans the publication of the Cadbury
Report - - which radically altered U.K. board compositions - - provides a natural experiment to
examine the effect of a change in board structure on board decisions. With a sample of 523 CEO
appointments over the period 1989 through 1999, we find a significant positive correlation
between the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment and the fraction of outside directors on
the board. More importantly, we find that the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment is
significantly higher among those firms that became compliant with the recommendations of the
Cadbury Report. This result indicates that increasing the representation of outside directors on
the board is likely to influence board decisions, at least as regards the appointment of inside or
outside CEOs.
An equally important question is whether the decisions will be better. We provide
evidence on that question by conducting an event study surrounding announcements of CEO
appointments in our sample. The average two-day stock price reaction to announcements of
outside CEO appointments is significantly greater than the average two-day stock price reaction
to announcements of inside CEO appointments. Thus, to the extent that outside directors are
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more likely to appoint outside CEOs, investors appear to perceive that boards with substantial
outside director representation make better decisions.
Our data appear to indicate that the global movement toward greater outside director
representation will lead to different and, perhaps, better board decisions. Several caveats are in
order. First, our study encompasses only one country. Whether our results can be generalized
globally is an open question. As emphasized by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Salines, Shleifer and Vishny
(1997, 1998) and Stulz and Williamson (2001), among others, corporate governance systems
appear to differ systematically across countries and cultures. If so, generalizing results from one
political or cultural regime to another may be hazardous. Although our results are buttressed by
an earlier study from the U.S., the similar common law origins of the U.K. and the U.S.
corporate governance systems must be considered when applying the results to other countries.
As other countries gain experience with their own mandates for additional outside directors, their
data will provide fertile grounds for further study of the questions examined herein.
Second, our analysis considers only one specific board task. Whether our results can be
generalized to other board decisions is also an open question.
Finally, the results of our analysis of whether decisions by boards with more outside
directors are better (as well as different) are suggestive, but still preliminary. In future work, we
hope to extend our analysis of whether outside directors make better decisions to encompass
other countries and other, more general, measures of corporate performance.
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Table 1
CEO appointments classified according to composition of the board of directors for a sample of 700 U.K. companies over the period 1989 through 1999
in comparison with CEO appointments for a sample of 969 U.S. companies over the period 1977 through 1988

Fraction
of outside
directors

CEO
turnover &
appointments

Outside
CEO
appointments

Outside CEO
appointments as
percent of all
CEO appointments

Fraction
of outside
directors

Turnover and appointments for U.K. companies
0 – 0.09
≥0.10 – 0.19
≥0.20 – 0.29
≥0.30 – 0.39
≥0.40 – 0.49
≥0.50 – 0.59
≥0.60 – 0.69
≥0.70 – 0.79
≥0.80 – 0.89
≥0.90 – 1.00

59
40
57
53
48
94
73
29
48
22

1
1
4
7
18
46
36
13
20
10

Total

523

156

1.70%
2.50
7.02
13.21
37.50
48.94
49.32
44.83
41.68
45.45%

CEO
turnover &
appointments

Outside
CEO
appointments

Outside CEO
appointments as
percent of all
CEO appointments

Turnover and appointments for U.S. companies

0 – 0.40
≥0.40 – 0.50
≥0.50 – 0.60
≥0.60 – 0.70
≥0.70 – 0.80
≥0.80 – 0.90
≥0.90 – 1.00

35
54
109
198
253
261
59

2
7
16
35
49
61
17

Total

969

187

5.71%
12.96
14.68
17.68
19.37
23.37
28.81%

Initial sample of U.K. companies consists of 914 randomly selected industrial and financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) as of December 1988. 214 companies were dropped from the initial sample
due to insufficient stock price and accounting data for the years 1985-1988. The final sample contains 700 companies. For each firm, for each year 1988-1999, the Corporate Register and/or annual filings maintained at
Company’s House were used to identify the CEO and the names of the directors. This procedure identified 523 changes in the CEO (i.e., CEO turnover and appointments) over the years 1989-1999. A director is considered
an “outsider” if he/she is listed as a non-executive director, is not related to the company’s controlling family, and was not employed by the company historically. If the new CEO was a member of the board in the prior year,
we consider this to be an inside CEO appointment. All others are outside CEO appointments confirmed by examination of articles in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times, and Macarthy’s News
Information Service. Data for a sample of 969 CEO changes (i.e., CEO turnover and appointments) at 588 large U.S. firms for the years 1970-1988 are from Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani (1996).
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Table 2
Number and rate of inside and outside CEO appointments over the period 1989 through 1999 for a sample of 700 U.K. companies

Year
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Total
(Average)

Number of
firms at
beginning
of the year
700
662
626
601
578
539
499
477
458
438
417

CEO
turnover &
appointments

Rate of CEO
turnover &
appointments

Board
size

Average
fraction
of
outside
directors

49
48
47
45
48
47
48
51
48
46
46

7.0
7.3
7.5
7.5
8.3
8.7
9.6
10.7
10.5
10.5
11.0

5.9
6.6
5.6
6.0
7.3
7.2
7.6
7.6
8.0
7.4
7.7

0.35
0.42
0.44
0.49
0.55
0.50
0.50
0.53
0.57
0.60
0.61

523

Outside
CEO appointments

Inside
CEO appointments

All firms

Number

Average
fraction
of
outside
directors

36
36
34
34
34
32
34
36
32
30
29

0.32
0.38
0.42
0.47
0.49
0.45
0.48
0.46
0.49
0.49
0.50

367

Number
13
12
13
11
14
15
14
15
16
16
17

Average
fraction
of
outside
directors
0.43
0.55
0.50
0.56
0.57
0.53
0.54
0.63
0.60
0.66
0.69

Outside CEO
appointments
as percent of
all CEO
appointments
26.53%
25.00
27.66
24.44
29.17
31.91
29.17
29.41
33.33
34.78
39.16%

156
(0.46)

(0.57)

The sample contains 700 industrial and financial firms listed on the LSE as of December 1988. The sample size declines through time due to takeovers, bankruptcies, and other delistings. For each firm, for each year 19881999, the Corporate Register and/or annual filings maintained at Company’s House were used to gather data on the identity of the CEO, the name of each director, the size of the board, and the number of outside directors.
This procedure identified 523 CEO changes (i.e., turnover and appointments). The rate of turnover and appointments is the number of appointments during the year divided by the number of companies in the sample at the
beginning of the year. A director is an “outsider” if he/she is listed as a non-executive director, is not related to the company’s controlling family, and was not employed by the company historically. If the new CEO was a
member of the board in the prior year, we consider this to be an “inside” CEO appointment. All others are “outside” CEO appointments confirmed by articles in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times, and
Macarthy’s News Information Service. Average fraction of outside directors is the average of the number of outside directors divided by total directors for each company as of the beginning of each year.
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Table 3
Number and rate of inside and outside CEO appointments grouped by Cadbury Committee compliance with respect to a minimum of 3 outside directors
over the period 1989 through 1999 for a sample of 700 U.K. companies
Panel A : CEO appointments for firms that adopted the Cadbury Committee recommendations of at least 3 outside directors anytime over 1989 through 1999
Outside
Inside
All firms
CEO appointments
CEO appointments
Outside CEO
Number of
Average
Average
Average
appointments
firms at
CEO
Rate of CEO
fraction of
fraction of
fraction of as percent of
beginning
Board
outside
outside
outside
all CEO
turnover &
turnover &
Year
of the year
appointments
appointments
size
directors
Number
directors
Number
directors
appointments
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

296
277
271
264
250
243
233
224
222
217
208

Total
(Average)

19
18
20
21
25
27
26
31
32
34
31

6.4
6.5
7.4
8.0
10.0
11.1
11.2
13.8
14.4
15.7
14.9

4.7
4.7
4.9
5.0
6.3
7.0
7.5
7.8
8.2
8.0
7.9

0.35
0.30
0.37
0.41
0.57
0.62
0.61
0.64
0.65
0.64
0.63

284

14
14
15
16
17
17
17
20
20
22
20

0.28
0.26
0.30
0.36
0.51
0.55
0.56
0.57
0.53
0.57
0.55

192

5
4
5
5
8
10
9
11
12
12
11

0.52
0.44
0.47
0.49
0.64
0.68
0.67
0.68
0.69
0.67
0.67

26.32%
22.22
25.00
23.81
32.00
39.04
34.62
35.48
37.50
35.29
35.48%

92
(0.53)

(0.63)

Panel B : CEO appointments for the firms that were always in compliance with the Cadbury Committee recommendations of at least 3 outside directors over 1993 through 1999
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

203
194
184
170
159

17
18
19
16
16

8.4
9.3
10.3
9.4
10.1

6.3
6.2
6.2
6.0
6.8

0.59
0.64
0.56
0.59
0.62

12
12
13
12
12

0.43
0.47
0.51
0.51
0.54

5
6
6
4
4

0.62
0.60
0.70
0.62
0.68

29.41%
33.33
31.58
25.00
25.00
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Continued/ Table 3

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Total
(Average)

147
138
130
119
109
105

14
14
13
9
9
9
154

9.5
10.1
10.0
7.6
8.3
8.6

7.2
7.9
7.9
7.9
7.9
7.9

0.56
0.65
0.55
0.61
0.63
0.61

10
10
10
6
6
8

0.54
0.54
0.59
0.55
0.55
0.53

111

4
4
3
3
3
3

0.66
0.62
0.65
0.67
0.67
0.66

28.57
28.57
23.08
33.33
33.33
33.33%

45
(0.53)

(0.66)

Panel C : CEO appointments for firms that adopted the Cadbury Committee recommendations of at least 3 outside directors anytime over 1993 through 1999 centered around the
year of adoption (y)
y-4
235
18
7.7
5.0
0.40
15
0.34
3
0.48
16.67%
y-3
239
19
8.0
5.7
0.45
15
0.36
4
0.50
21.05
y-2
244
20
8.2
6.1
0.47
16
0.34
4
0.53
20.00
y-1
248
23
9.3
6.4
0.48
18
0.40
5
0.55
21.74
y
y+1
247
39
15.8
7.8
0.61
25
0.56
14
0.69
35.90
y+2
242
33
13.6
7.7
0.63
20
0.59
13
0.68
39.39
y+3
237
36
15.2
7.8
0.62
21
0.58
15
0.64
41.67
y+4
233
34
14.6
8.0
0.60
19
0.55
15
0.65
44.12%
Total
(Average)

222

149

73
(0.50)

(0.63)

The sample contains 700 industrial and financial firms listed on the LSE as of December 1988. The sample size declines through time due to takeovers, bankruptcies, and other delistings. For each firm, for each year 19881999, the Corporate Register and/or annual filings maintained at Company’s House were used to gather data on the identity of the CEO, the names of the directors, the size of the board, and the number of outside directors.
This procedure identified 523 CEO changes (i.e., turnover and appointments). The rate of turnover and appointments is the number of appointments during the year divided by the number of companies in the sample at the
beginning of the year. A director is an “outsider” if he/she is listed as a non-executive director, is not related to the company’s controlling family, and was not employed by the company historically. If the new CEO was a
member of the board in the prior year, we consider this to be an “inside” CEO appointment. All others are “outside” CEO appointments confirmed by articles in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times, and
Macarthy’s News Information Service. Average fraction of outside directors is the average of the number of outside directors divided by total directors for each company as of the beginning of each year. The 700 firms in the
sample are separated into 3 sets. The first set (shown in Panel A) is firms that adopted the Cadbury recommendation of a minimum of 3 outside directors over the period 1989-1999 (i.e., they increased the number of outside
directors to at least 3). The second set (shown in Panel B) was always in compliance with the Cadbury recommendation of a minimum number of 3 outside directors in all years 1989-1999. The third set of firms (not shown
in the table) was never in compliance with the Cadbury recommendation of a minimum of 3 outside directors at anytime over the period 1989-1999.
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Table 4
Probit regressions of outside CEO appointments for a sample of 523 CEO appointments by 700 U.K. firms over the period 1989 through 1999
Independent Variables
Intercept
Control variables:
ISAR (Industry- and size-adjusted stock return)
Log of book value of assets
Indicator for forced CEO turnover
Indicator for financial institutions
Board share ownership
Institutional share ownership
Board size
Indicator for origin of incumbent CEO
Outside director variables:
Fraction of outside directors
Fraction of outside directors squared
≥ 0.000 to 0.299 outside directors
≥ 0.300 to 0.499 outside directors
≥ 0.500 to 0.799 outside directors
≥ 0.800 to 1.000 outside directors
Indicator for Cadbury adoption
Log-likelihood
Pseudo r2

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

0.954

(0.414)

0.809

(0.496)

0.736

(0.535)

0.872

(0.456)

-0.122
-1.021
0.745
-0.047
-0.152
-0.607
0.019
-0.264

(0.070)
(0.022)
(0.000)
(0.774)
(0.600)
(0.284)
(0.393)
(0.168)

-0.124
-1.014
0.743
-0.043
-0.167
-0.630
0.015
-0.265

(0.066)
(0.024)
(0.000)
(0.797)
(0.567)
(0.266)
(0.497)
(0.167)

-0.122
-0.995
0.763
-0.071
-0.164
-0.581
0.017
-0.279

(0.067)
(0.024)
(0.000)
(0.660)
(0.588)
(0.316)
(0.442)
(0.145)

-0.127
-1.035
0.765
-0.060
-0.162
-0.623
0.012
-0.274

(0.065)
(0.022)
(0.000)
(0.708)
(0.584)
(0.272)
(0.606)
(0.152)

2.077
-0.585

(0.046)
(0.572)
2.741
2.390
1.881
1.732

(0.062)
(0.002)
(0.000)
(0.000)

2.500
2.334
1.762
1.763
0.375

(0.063)
(0.004)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.010)

2.690
2.303
1.807
1.659
0.078

(0.066)
(0.004)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.588)

-266.57
0.1311

-265.68
0.1341

-267.22
0.1290

-265.81
0.1336

The sample contains 700 industrial and financial firms listed on the LSE as of December 1988. For each firm, for each year 1988-1999, the Corporate Register and/or annual filings at Company’s House were used to
gather data on the identity of the CEO, the names of the directors, the size of the board, the number of outside directors the fraction of shares owned by the board and financial institutions, and whether the incumbent CEO
had come form inside or outside the company. This procedure identified 523 CEO appointments. A director is an “outsider” if he/she is listed as a non-executive director, is not related to the company’s controlling
family, and not employed by the company historically. If the new CEO was a member of the board in the prior year, we consider this to be an “inside” CEO appointment. All others are “outside” CEO appointments
confirmed by articles in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times and Macarthy’s News Information Service. The fraction of outside directors is the number of outside directors divided by total directors for
each company as of the beginning of each year. The dependent variable in the regressions is 1 if an outside CEO is appointed and 0 otherwise. Stock price and book assets are from Datastream. Industry- and sizeadjusted stock returns (ISAR) are calculated by subtracting the daily stock returns of an industry- and size-matched portfolio from the daily return of the sample firm beginning 253 days prior to and ending 3 days prior to
the announcement of a CEO appointment. Indicator for forced turnover is 1 when: (a) a news article states that the CEO was “fired”; (b) an article states that the CEO “resigned”; or (c) an article indicates that the
company was experiencing poor performance. In addition, for (b) and (c), the executive must be less than 60 years old. The Cadbury-adoption indicator is 1 when firms increased the number of outside directors to at
least three over the period 1993-1999. p-value for 2-tailed tests are in parentheses.
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Table 5
Stock price response to 523 CEO appointments by 700 U.K. firms over the period 1989 through 1999
Panel A : Stock price response on the announcement of CEO appointments
Number
Inside CEO
appointments

Number

Outside CEO
appointments

Appointments

367

0.203 (0.20)

156

0.794 (0.01)

Pre-Cadbury CEO appointments
Post-Cadbury CEO appointments

140
227

0.219 (0.19)
0.187 (0.21)

49
107

0.781 (0.01)
0.803 (0.01)

Departing CEO had been appointed
from inside the firm
Departing CEO had been appointed
from outside the firm

319

0.210 (0.19)

127

0.818 (0.01)

48

0.191 (0.20)

29

0.764 (0.02)

Panel B : Stock price response on the announcement of CEO appointments classified according to likelihood of a CEO appointment based on the last regression in Table 4
0.00 to 0.33 (Low probability)

49

0.311 (0.12)

50

1.135 (<0.01)

0.34 to 0.66 (Medium probability)

125

0.207 (0.20)

57

0.784 (0.01)

0.67 to 1.00 (High probability)

193

0.097 (0.62)

49

0.430 (0.05)

Panel C : Cross-sectional regressions for the 2-day announcement period excess return on the likelihood of a CEO appointment based on the last regression in Table 4
Regression coefficient (p-value)

367

-0.168 (0.29)

156

-0.435 (0.10)

The sample contains 700 industrial and financial firms listed on the LSE as of December 1988. For each firm, for each year 1988-1999, the Corporate Register and/or annual filings at Company’s House were used to gather
data on the identity of the CEO, the names of the directors, the size of the board, the number of outside directors, the fraction of shares owned by the board and financial institutions, and whether the incumbent CEO was from
inside or outside the comapny. This procedure identified 523 CEO appointments. A director is an “outsider” if he/she is listed as a non-executive director, is not related to the company’s controlling family, and was not
employed by the company historically. If the new CEO was a member of the board in the prior year, we consider this to be an “inside” CEO appointment. All others are “outside” CEO appointments confirmed by articles in
the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times and Macarthy’s News Information Service. Stock prices are from Datastream. Event study stock returns are calculated by subtracting the daily stock returns of the
LSE All Share Index from the daily return of the sample firm 1day prior to and ending on the announcement day of a CEO appointment. The likelihood of a CEO appointment is estimated from the final regression in Table 4.
p-value for 2-tailed tests are in parentheses.

